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DECREASING COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT COSTS: THE
SCOPE OF A GRADUATED RESPONSE
OLIVIER BOMSEL AND HERITIANA RANAIVOSON
Abstract. The digitization of copyrighted goods and the dematerialization
of their distribution over the Internet have caused a weakening of copyright,
a key institution of the creative industries. One reason is that, during the
broadband roll-out, copyright enforcement costs have become superior to the
estimated benefits of copyright. This paper analyses the causes of this situation
and suggests how a graduated response to infringers can decrease copyright
enforcement costs.
The paper starts with a review of the economic literature on copyright
that focuses on its industrial aspects. It then analyses how, all along the
distribution vertical chain, the consumer’s impunity provides incentives to free
ride on copyright, which rapidly increases copyright enforcement costs. It
finally depicts the graduated response mechanism and the voluntary agreement
that initiated this system in France. In conclusion, the increase in the cost
of free-riding for the final consumer should lead to a decrease in copyright
enforcement costs and to higher returns in the creative industries.
1. Introduction
In all capitalist economies, the institution of copyright has become essential
to the development of creative industries. Copyright consists of the granting of
an exclusive right to the exploitation of reproductions (and representations) of an
artistic or literary work. As such it has contributed to the accumulation of large
copyright portfolios that allow the risks of financing and marketing new creations to
be handled (Caves, 2000). From an economic point of view, the copyright institution
appears as an internalization means whose social benefits should remain superior
to its social costs. Among these costs are the enforcement costs, which include the
costs related to the exclusion of unauthorized users.
In the physical economy, enforcement costs are bundled with the packaging of
the copyrighted information on a physical support, or with a specific decryption
device in the broadcast distribution system. Here the main copyright infringers
are commercial intermediaries that take the responsibility to produce and distrib-
ute counterfeited packaged goods (books, CDs, DVDs) or set-top-box decryption
devices.
Thanks to Richard Watt for his support and helpful suggestions.
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Therefore, in the physical world, copyright enforcement is based upon legal de-
terrence targeting those intermediaries. The threat of a strong penalty for convicted
infringers is enough to keep the expected costs of infringing largely above the antic-
ipated benefits for the infringers, at least in most developed countries (that stand
as the main markets from an economic point of view). And the restricted number
of infringers keeps the the penalty, in other words the cost of being caught, at a
socially acceptable level. As a result, this philosophy was largely integrated into
the digital copyright laws voted in the late 1990’s or the early 2000’s such as the
DMCA (1998) in the USA and the EUCD (2001) in the EU.
While the physical economy is far from having disappeared or from even becom-
ing negligible, the dematerialization of copyrighted goods is deeply aﬀecting the
creative industries. It notably enables storage, circulation and exchange of digi-
tized content over the Internet. As soon as an exchange technology is available
(peer-to-peer for instance), any consumer can become an active counterfeiter while
enduring almost no costs at all. As a result, the scope of copyright infringement
has changed, and so has the structure of enforcement costs. In other words, heavy
fines, which are eﬀective towards a limited number of intermediaries, cannot deter
massive copyright infringement. Not only does the expected value of the fine di-
minish with the number of infringers, but the misfortune of being caught appears
more and more unfair to the society since the size of the fine increases and since
there is no longer a commercial intent on the behalf of these infringers.
This weakness in the institution of copyright and the corresponding legal loop-
holes have been exploited by the digital industries, i.e. those that provide consumers
with technologies allowing free access to content. As a result, in most countries the
number of copyright infringers has increased in recent years. At the same time
copyright is being debated. In December 2005, the legal implementation of the
EUCD in the French parliament brought an amendment proposing a levy system
(licence globale), a form of compulsory license applying to all audiovisual contents
exchanged over the Internet. While this amendment was finally rejected, the debate
illustrated the weakness of exclusive IP rights in the digital era.
This paper examines to what extent the French scheme of a graduated response
may restore incentives to enforce copyright. The next section provides a review of
the literature on copyright that focuses on its industrial aspects. In Section 3 the
paper then examines how, all along the distribution vertical chain, final consumer
impunity provides incentives to free ride on copyright, which increases the copyright
enforcement costs. Section 4 depicts the voluntary agreement that initiated the
French graduated response system and shows how it aims to decrease copyright
enforcement costs. Section 5 brings some conclusions regarding the impact of the
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graduated response as a means to internalise copyright enforcement within the
content and network industries.
2. The costs and benefits of copyright: a review of the literature
Since the 1960’s and increasingly through the 1980’s, the concept of Intellectual
Property has gradually included legal instruments as various as patents, trademarks
and copyright (Blaug, 2005). There is now a well-established economic analysis of
the arguments both in favor and against copyright (and more generally intellec-
tual property). They are important to characterize how this property should be
designed, notably in the context of the spreading of the Internet and its new uses.
For that reason here we remind the reader of the main arguments that are to be
taken into account when assessing the economic eﬀects of copyright.
In doing so an important distinction is to be made between two categories of
rights holders: the creators and the intermediaries in production and distribution.
Actually both may have diﬀerent incentives to produce and distribute cultural
goods (Plant, 1934). The main point is that all creators do not necessarily work for
money, rather for recognition, and may even be ready to pay to have their works
published and distributed. Even when money does stand as an incentive it does not
necessarily take the form of the granting of a copyright. On the contrary there is
a clear and direct interest for the intermediaries in production and distribution in
having their contents protected by copyright. As a result, economists have generally
investigated the benefits of copyright in terms of incentives for these intermediaries
(Benhamou and Farchy, 2007).
For the same reason, and all the more so as we are interested in the industrial
organization of the creative industries, our analysis focuses on the intermediaries
rather than on the creators themselves. To conduct this analysis, we rely on the
usual comparison between the costs and the benefits of copyright.
From a normative point of view, the traditional analysis of the optimal copyright
can be described as a balance between on the one hand its positive impact on pro-
duction and distribution and on the other hand its negative impact on utilization
(Besen, 1987). As Landes and Posner (1989, p. 326) state, “[c]opyright protection
(. . . ) trades oﬀ the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of pro-
viding incentives to create the work in the first place. Striking the correct balance
between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.”.
The main benefit of copyright is its capacity to favor the production and dis-
tribution of meaningful content. Actually, creative goods (like information goods
in general) are public goods, i.e. they share the properties of non-rivalry and non-
excludability. However they have high fixed costs of production and marketing and
low variable costs of reproduction and/or distribution (Arrow, 1962). However,
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being a legal monopoly on a work of art, copyright has an immediate downside on
society as a whole since it restrains the diﬀusion of protected goods.
Beyond this well-known literature our analysis focuses on the role of copyright at
the industry level.1 It relies mainly on the transaction costs analysis. The point of
departure of the reasoning here is the so-called Coase theorem that states that when
trade in an externality is possible and there are no transaction costs, bargaining
will lead to an eﬃcient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property rights
(Coase, 1960). However the Coase theorem assumes that there is no transaction
cost, which is never the case, and maybe even less in our case than in general.
Moreover the right holder itself first endures costs since “intellectual property is very
easy to expropriate” (Watt, 2000, p.1). Therefore, “administrative and enforcement
costs” are important, which “include the costs of setting up boundaries or erecting
imaginary fences that separate protected and unprotected elements of a work. They
also include the costs of excluding trespassers, proving infringement and sanctioning
copyright violators.” (Landes, 2003, p.134). Moreover such costs depend on the
technological context as we illustrate in the next section.
As a consequence the economic function of copyright is to allow cultural goods
to have the characteristics of private goods by making it possible for rights holders
to exclude other users, potential competitors as well as final consumers (Demsetz,
1970). In other words, copyright is above all a property right and more precisely a
form of private ownership. Actually, “[p]rivate ownership implies that the commu-
nity recognizes the right of the owner to exclude others from exercising the owner’s
private rights” (Demsetz, 1967, p.354). As such, it allows the internalization of
costs and benefits.
Demsetz (1967) states that property rights develop when it becomes interesting
to internalize eﬀects that were until then mere externalities because “the gains
of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”. As a result “the
emergence of new (. . . ) property rights will be in response to changes in technology
and relative prices.” (p.350). Demsetz considers property rights in general but this
applies to copyright as well: with the development of printing, it (slowly) became
more detrimental to have one’s creations copied by competitors. So publishers and,
to a lesser extent, writers had a clear opportunity to get exclusive rights over the
writings.
1Our approach is somehow echoed by the current reinforcement of copyright legislation all over
the World (e.g. the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998 in the USA), which
shows that copyright is more and more considered by the governments as playing a role in the
global competition by allowing innovation in the creative industries. This trend may show that
the welfare approach of copyright, based on the spreading out of useful information in a given
community, is now challenged by the taking into account of copyright as an industrial asset.
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As a consequence of copyrighting a cultural good, the right holder may keep all
benefits linked to the exploitation of the work, either directly or indirectly (e.g.
through licenses). Moreover, the market power given by copyright enables the
implementation of profitable price discrimination.
Finally cultural goods are subject to significant market uncertainty, which means
that it is not possible to know in advance which goods are going to be successful.
Therefore, were there to be no copyright, successful goods would be likely to be
reproduced by competitors. Actually those competitors would avoid, on the one
hand, betting on innovative and thus risky products, and on the other hand, endur-
ing high fixed costs. Such a situation would all the more be penalising for investors
for whom entry is rather easy in the creative industries.
“Because copyright tends to be a costly system of property, economics predicts
that property rights in copyrighted works will be more limited than for tangible
or physical property.” (Landes, 2003, p.135). As a consequence, “various copyright
doctrines that limit protection can be best explained as rough eﬀorts to achieve
the optimal balance between incentive benefits and access and other costs in or-
der to promote economic eﬃciency.” (Landes, 2003, p.135). These limitations can
take numerous forms in practice. First of all, a common way of counterbalanc-
ing excessively high enforcement costs of copyright is to supplement the copyright
with specific levy systems. Those levies are then collected and redistributed to right
holders by collecting societies. Fair use — or exceptions to the author’s right — is an-
other common device that can be interpreted as a way of reducing transaction costs
by allowing some uses whose enforcement costs would be superior to the eventual
related profit for the right holder (Gordon, 1982). The limitation of the duration
of the copyright is usually seen as a way to balance the incentives for production
and distribution and the allowance of access by the public once the investment is
repaid.
In a nutshell, copyright is a legal institution that enables a partial internalization
of the costs and benefits linked to the production and distribution of cultural goods.
Our approach focuses on the industrial organization of copyright, i.e. the trade-oﬀ
between the benefits and costs from the industry’s point of view. We now turn to
an analysis of the advent of the digital era to see its influence on these costs, and
notably the enforcement costs.
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3. The Internet roll-out:2 new benefits and new costs
3.1. Digitization and the development of online piracy. One of the most
visible eﬀects of the digitization of copyrighted contents and of the advent of the
Internet is the surge of massive infringement practices that rely on peer-to-peer
software. Massive piracy has led to a wide questioning of the economic relevance
of copyright in a digital environment (Varian, 2005). It first introduces a break
into the traditional economic cost-benefit analysis of copyright piracy. Actually in
the analogue environment, the benefits of the diﬀusion of an unauthorized copy
are similar to the limited release of a degraded version. Under such an approach,
unauthorized copying was seen as a means of stimulating the network eﬀects of the
copyrighted good and enlarging its markets, with perhaps only a marginal negative
impact on the right holders (Watt, 2000). Digitization changes the scale of the
phenomenon.
This questioning of the economic relevance of copyright in a digital environment
can be analyzed by using Demsetz’s approach of property rights. Actually Demsetz
states that “[i]f the main allocative function of property rights is the internaliza-
tion of beneficial and harmful eﬀects, then the emergence of property rights can
be understood best by their association with the emergence of new beneficial or
harmful eﬀects” (1967, p.350). In the following, we analyze whether the massive
infringement of property rights can be understood best by its association with the
emergence of new harmful or beneficial eﬀects.
We will therefore suppose in this section that there are new benefits and new
costs for the industry linked to the digitization of copyrighted goods and the dema-
terialization of their distribution and try to point out how they might have impacted
the previous consensus on copyright.
The benefits are clearly associated with new versioning possibilities and better
discrimination of the consumers’ preferences through digital distribution. Thus
digitization was first perceived as an opportunity for the major actors of the enter-
tainment industry. For example, the advent of the compact-disc put an end to the
crisis endured by the recording industry and allowed the beginning of a prosperous
era for the industry (Burnett, 1996). Initially, the Internet was considered an ad-
ditional outlet for music (Ranaivoson, 2003). Moreover, digital distribution allows
2We use the expression “roll-out” to designate the emergence of a market showing strong network
eﬀects. In such a market where the consumer’s utility increases with the number of consumers
(Rolhfs, 1974), a critical mass of consumers should be reached before the utility of the service
stabilizes over its price. When this occurs, each consumer joining the market increases the utility
of all the others, allowing the service to reach all its targeted market. The expression “roll-
out” — which can be physically associated with the deployment of an infrastructure — depicts the
expansion of a market providing utility that grows with the number of consumers.
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new modes of signaling and selecting contents, individualized access and the pos-
sibility for each consumer to store large content libraries or play-lists on portable
personal devices. It then enlarges the addressable markets of all copyrighted goods.
However, these benefits can be obtained only once an extensive digital distribution
system is rolled-out.
The costs are associated with copyright enforcement. While the material support
provides rivalness and excludability, the full digitization of copyrighted goods re-
quires technical means like specific software (e.g. DRM) to achieve exclusion. Such
technical means are legally recognized and strongly protected by the digital copy-
right laws (Bomsel and Geﬀroy, 2006). However, the key point regarding copyright
enforcement concerns the ability of the final consumer to exchange unprotected
files with other consumers, which has sometimes been considered as belonging to
fair use. This ability has created a legal loophole favoring the roll-out of several
generations of peer-to-peer software (Bomsel, 2007). Not only did it take six years
for the US Supreme Court to issue a decision regarding the legality of peer-to-peer
applications but the loophole also created a breach in copyright enforcement allow-
ing millions of Internet users around the world to free-ride on copyright. Such a
situation was not anticipated by digital copyright laws that had kept a heavy sanc-
tion system targeting in practice only a limited number of infringers. Therefore, in
spite of many attempts to sue infringers, right holders have proved quite ineﬃcient
in enforcing copyright through the legal sanction mechanism.
3.2. The Internet roll-out game and the role of network eﬀects. The online
piracy phenomenon is linked to the roll-out of the Internet. The roll-out is actually
characterized by the importance of network eﬀects. There are network eﬀects or
externalities as soon as the utility linked to one’s consumption is influenced by the
number of other consumers (Varian, 2000). In our case, network eﬀects are positive:
the more consumers use a network, the greater is every consumer’s satisfaction.
They may be direct or indirect (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). Network eﬀects are direct
when the number of users has a direct impact on the utility derived from a product
and indirect when they are mediated by another market (Liebowitz and Margolis,
2002). An example of direct network eﬀects is the e-mail: the more people have
an e-mail address, the more useful is e-mail to each user. Indirect eﬀects generally
correspond to the development of complementary products. For example, DVD
players become more useful as DVDs catalogues become more extensive.
Since digitization allows packet switching across communication networks, Inter-
net has been able to expand as a one-to-one communication system and as a media,
i.e. a means that allows information to flow from one source to many anonymous
individuals. E-mail, web browsing and e-commerce services have allowed network
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eﬀects to increase thus making the roll-out of dial-up services easier and faster.
However the gain in utility associated for all these specific uses with wider band
services might have been too small to justify the roll-out of the Internet infrastruc-
ture and of broadband as we saw it in most developed countries.
The possible access to free copyrighted content here played the role of a subsidy.
The availability of such content on the Internet has thus allowed not only the ISPs,
but also all the equipment contributing to access, to get a larger share of what
the consumers would have spent for content. The breach in copyright enforcement
has helped the Internet industry to roll-out broadband infrastructure and terminal
equipment by rising at nearly no cost the consumer’s utility thanks to free content
access.
Figure 1 allows us to represent the impact of network eﬀects. These can be
illustrated by a demand curve corresponding to the marginal private utility of the
service (a), supplemented by another curve corresponding to the marginal social
utility including the external eﬀects of other subscribers (i.e. a new subscription
increases the utility of being a subscriber by (b)). It is assumed that the external
eﬀects are inversely proportional to the number of subscribers, which means that a
new subscriber brings more additional utility to others when there are only a few
of them than when the market is widely covered. The two curves meet when the
market is saturated.
The consumers subscribe according to their private utility. It is assumed that the
marginal cost of the service is c, constant. A1 is the number of subscribers whose
private utility is superior to the marginal cost of the service. However, thanks to
the external eﬀects, a larger number of customers A2 could have a total utility
higher than c. A2 represents the socially optimal number of subscribers. To recruit
the (A2 −A1) customers the service needs to be subsidized, which can be done by
pricing at p, where p is less than c. In a second phase, prices can be increased
to match the total utility of the marginal subscriber. Network economics largely
depend on the size of the benefits associated with the increase (A2 − A1) of the
market and on the way the subsidy required to capture these consumers is financed
and recovered.
The cost of the subsidy is proportional to the number of subsidized subscribers.
If it is not possible to discriminate among subscribers, the cost of the subsidy to
reach A2 will be (c − p) × A2. If it is possible to discriminate the service, which
means that the price p is only applied to those customers having a willingness-to-pay
inferior to c, then the cost will be only (c− p)× (A2 −A1).
Now we come to the impact of peer-to-peer on the roll-out of broadband ser-
vices. The possibility of free-riding on copyrights provides additional utility to the
consumer which operates like a subsidy in kind. In Figure 2, we can then draw
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Figure 1. Network eﬀect subsidies
three curves. The lowest one corresponds to demand for broadband services with-
out copyright infringing means (P2P). It is convex because, when this service is
launched in the early 2000’s, most of the broadband non-infringing applications
concern business uses. The residential consumer has little utility for these if he
can get dial-up services.3 The middle curve reflects the marginal individual utility
for broadband including P2P applications. It is distributed just as in Figure 1.
The top curve again represents the marginal social utility which is higher than the
others because broadband services pull the adoption of digital standards in telecom
networks, terminal equipment and digital file formats.
Without P2P applications, the price required to reach the optimal number of
subscribers (A2) would have been p0. Therefore the amount of the subsidy needed
to reach that point would have been (c − p0) × A2. Thanks to P2P, however, this
subsidy is only (c− p)×A2, meaning that P2P reduces that cost by (p− p0)×A2.
The beauty of P2P is that, not only does it decrease the subsidy that is required
3Access to content through the Internet was a commercial argument of the ISP even though there
was almost no content legally available. In France, broadband services were sold at double the
price of dial-up services. For most of the residential subscribers, this diﬀerence was justified by
the access to free content (Bomsel, 2007).
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Figure 2. The peer-to-peer subsidy
to be paid by the Internet industries, but also the subsidy in kind is discriminated
among the consumers having the lowest willingness-to-pay for legitimate services.
In consequence, the social cost of that subsidy, as represented by the shaded area,
is lower than what the Internet industries would have had to pay to reach the same
demand optimum.
The P2P subsidy enables all the Internet industries — from the chip manufacturer
to the web search engine — to boost their roll-out. It is borne by the content industry
which sustains the negative externality of copyright infringement. As long as the
benefits of the Internet roll-out overwhelm the negative externality of copyright
infringement, there can be a social consensus on this means of subsidizing the
rollout. However, once the roll-out is over, the benefits of the subsidy saturate
while the costs of infringement keep increasing.
3.3. Free riding in the copyright vertical chain. By allowing transactions be-
tween the owner and market intermediaries, copyrights shape the vertical relations
linking the right holder to the final consumer. If the final consumer is allowed
to free-ride on copyright, then all intermediaries providing access means will have
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an incentive to help him doing so. This situation propagates free-riding in all the
vertical relations downstream of the right holder. In the music market, equipment
manufacturers have oﬀered products that allow the consumer to read circumvented
files. Simultaneously they have engaged in a standards war on encryption software
or DRMs (Farchy and Ranaivoson, 2005).
This war was made possible by the fact that MP3 players provided utility in
storing and reading unencrypted files, many of which were accessible through file-
sharing. Poor copyright enforcement has encouraged each equipment manufacturer
to use the consumer’s free-riding on copyright as a means to push his own en-
cryption standard. It eventually resulted in the abandoning of DRMs although
they were the main tools designed to protect copyrights envisaged by the digital
copyright laws (Geﬀroy, 2009).
New copyright distribution systems are supposed to bring better discrimination
since they allow consumers to be reached who were until then not interested. It
is particularly true in the case of Internet which brings new selection and access
means. However the use of digital devices to circumvent copyright also allows the
final consumer to resell or share the product at a very low marginal cost in a non-
degraded format. So while, on the one hand, it is considered that digital distribution
may facilitate versioning and price discrimination (Varian, 2000), on the other, the
circumvention of copyright appears as a major obstacle to this benefit.
Moreover any new distribution system may also cannibalize existing markets:
consumers can switch from one version to another. For example, the advent of tele-
vision led to an irreversible reduction in theatrical revenues. For this reason, the
level of competition changes — and generally increases — when a new distribution
system appears. However, if the new entrants stimulate free-riding, the distributors
that keep enforcing copyright are disadvantaged by this unfair competition. Not
only the right holders encompass a negative externality, but the distorted compe-
tition amongst content distribution systems generates incorrect investment signals.
It deters investment in loyal distribution systems and creates incentives to innovate
in circumvention technologies.
This situation challenges the cost-benefit analysis of copyright. On the one hand,
digitization allows the roll-out of a new system bringing substantial potential ben-
efits, and on the other, it raises sharply and possibly permanently the enforcement
cost of the copyright. During the roll-out phase, politicians are more sensitive to
the positive externalities of the Internet than to the negative of massive copyright
infringement. And right holders embark in lawsuits against infringers which may
prove more symbolic than eﬀective (because of their cost) to enforce the institution.
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However, once the new system is rolled-out, the industry enters another phase.
The positive externalities of the new network tend to saturate. The negative exter-
nalities of massive infringement are peaking. Internet access suppliers can hardly
get new subscribers and rather aim at raising their average revenue per user. Copy-
right enforcement, the costs of which have risen sharply during the former phase,
becomes then a key condition to reap the benefits from the institution.
4. Copyright enforcement in a digital environment: the scope of a
graduated response.
We assume in this section that the roll-out of broadband access is over. In such a
context, right holders have stronger arguments to defend their views on copyright.
However the Internet players are still not incited to prevent free-riding while right
holders lack the means to enforce their copyrights.
4.1. A critical view on the existing legislation against online piracy. The
adoption of a new set of laws shows that the environment for copyright has changed
with the digitization and the spreading of the Internet. The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act in the USA in 1998 and the European Union Copyright Directive
in the EU in 2001 have both been introduced as the implementation of the 1996
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty. Both notably
led to higher fines for counterfeiters and prohibited circumvention of technological
measures for the protection of works (Article 11 of the WIPO Treaty; Section 103
(17 U.S.C Sec. 1201(a) (1)) of the DMCA; European Directive 2001/29/EC). In
2006, France adopted the law on authors’ rights and related rights in the information
society,4 which stands as the implementation of the EU Copyright Directive.
Although these laws are more repressive than the previously existing ones, they
have not succeeded in preventing piracy. The main reason is that the extension
of sanctions to DRMs’ circumvention is insuﬃcient to deter Internet users from
illegally downloading content. In fact this extension did not raise the perceived cost
of infringing for the user. This cost depends on the probability of being caught and
the fine associated to being caught. The behavior of the internet user is determined
by the expected fine — the perceived probability of being caught multiplied by the
amount of the fine.5 The laws focused on the second aspect. As a result only a
few cases (compared to the number of infringers) were brought to courts.6 Not
4Droit d’Auteur et Droits Voisins dans la Société d’Information.
5The expected fine is important only if the user is risk neutral, which is unlikely to ever be the
case. Most households would be risk averse, and infringing activists might be risk seekers. We
use expected values as a simplification.
6For example in the USA 30 000 Internet users have been prosecuted. Most cases have led to
out-of-court settlements for a few thousands dollars. One case ended in front of a jury for 220 000
dollars penalty but the judgment runs for appeal.
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only has it not been profitable for the claimants but while the content industries
wanted these cases to be threatening, they only appeared as unfair and pointless.
And piracy in general did not decrease.
In fact, such sanctions may prove to be a deterrent only if they apply in last
resort against a few habitual infringers. The more numerous the infringers are, the
less eﬃcient the sanction is. Therefore a solution is for the right holders to find a
way to threaten a greater number of people, possibly to deter infringers before they
get fined. This can be achieved through two means, either directly by the ISP or
indirectly through the application of the law.
In the USA, the concentration of the studios and the dominance of cable in sup-
plying broadband services have allowed right holders to oblige their distributors to
cooperate in tracking and annoying infringers (by sending warnings and suspend-
ing the service). This can be achieved through incentives written into distribution
private contracts. Some loopholes still remain like the coverage of a University cam-
pus where infringing students are diﬃcult to track, or the competition with DSL
providers who are less dependent than cable operators on distribution contracts.
But by and large, the Coase theorem could apply, meaning that right holders and
distributors might agree together on ways to master the piracy externalities.7 Or
that concentrated right holders can directly negotiate with suspected infringers
under the threat of the law to be applied in last resort.
In countries like France (as in Canada, New Zealand and in many European
countries), the right holders are highly scattered and the telecom industry leads
the broadband roll-out. As a result, the players of the Internet sector (notably the
ISPs) cannot be forced to cooperate with right holders to fight against piracy. First,
they do not want to annoy the customers who they have implicitly encouraged to
free ride. Second, they do not want to lose markets to the benefit of their free riding
competitors. And third, the law grants them safe harbors making them non-liable
for how the consumer uses their service. While it may be that the major ISPs would
be ready to operate in a piracy free environment, they do not want to cooperate
spontaneously with right holders. We show how the French voluntary agreement
aims at achieving their cooperation.
4.2. Analysis of the French voluntary agreement. We first briefly describe
the agreement before analyzing its economic aspects. In the end, we show that the
agreement aims at having intellectual property rights enforced at the consumers’
level while avoiding free-riding on the ISP market.
7However, in a decision of August 2008, the FCC has prevented Comcast from spoiling the service
of customers suspected to be massive copyright infringers. This decision was justified by the
wish to preserve network neutrality, e.g. to prevent the content owners from interfering with the
management of the network infrastructure (Sieradzki and Maxwell, 2008).
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The French voluntary agreement aims at enforcing copyright law in the digital
environment. It was signed in November 2007 at the Elysée Palace by the five
major Internet access providers and thirty-five institutions representing the music
and audiovisual industries. The agreement has two main aspects. First it insists
on the need to promote a legal oﬀer. Among the proposals are a change of the
regulated release windows for movies or a reduction of the value added tax for all
cultural goods and services. The second aspect is a scheme of graduated response
to piracy over the Internet. The economic goal of the agreement is explicitly to
raise the cost of piracy for the Internet user.
According to that scheme, the infringers will be tracked by the right holders
over the Internet. Then a watchdog will relay their warnings through the ISPs to
the suspected infringers. The watchdog is named HADOPI (High Authority for
the diﬀusion of content and protection of rights over the Internet)8 and has to be
empowered by a law. After two strikes, the ISPs will be requested by the watchdog
to suspend and blacklist the detected infringers. An oﬃcial indicator of piracy will
be published every month to assess the eﬃciency of the scheme. In this framework
the watchdog is needed, on the one hand, to enforce ISPs to cooperate with right
holders, and on the other, to avoid free riding on the ISP market.
The law was voted unanimously by the French Senate in November 2008 and in
a more tumultuous context by the National Assembly in April 2009. However, in
June 2009, the Constitutional Court (the French Supreme Court) invalidated the
sanction mechanism of the law by ruling that only a court decision could suspend
the Internet access of a French citizen.9 The law was then changed in order to
allow the suspected infringers to be sued in courts. It was re-voted in September
2009 and finally validated by the Constitutional Court. The new procedure, whose
implementation will be more costly than the administrative suspension, keeps the
principle of graduated sanctions — including access suspension and fines. In the
end however it should be more repressive for the infringers. It is estimated that
10,000 warnings should be sent every day while about 50,000 cases will be judged
and sanctioned during the first year of enforcement.10
It is still too early to predict what will be the eﬀects of this law. As far as costs
are concerned, the law will obviously generate in the short run new enforcement
expenditures. If the law is poorly applied or does not impact consumers’ behavior,
this money will have been spent for nothing. But if the law deters the consumer from
8Haute autorité pour la diﬀusion des œuvres et la protection des droits sur Internet.
9The Government has defended the law by putting forward the artists who are beneficiaries of
the rights. By doing so, it has explicitly taken the defense of some notorious owners instead of
defending the property institution. This might have influenced the Constitutional Court in its
decision to protect the average citizen against the owners’ greed.
10Projet de loi relatif à la protection pénale de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique sur Internet.
Etude d’Impact. June 2009.
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free-riding, it will restore copyright proof investment signals both in the creative
industries and in their distribution networks. In particular, the law will generate
administrative costs for the ISPs through the relaying of the warnings and the
implementation of the eventual suspension. Those costs will create a market for
technical solutions (such as watermarking, filtering or monitoring) to prevent the
consumer from the disutility of being sued. As a consequence, the restoring of
a credible infringing cost for the consumer would pass the copyright enforcement
costs onto the industry. The enforcement costs should then be progressively reduced
thanks to piracy proof incentives in the vertical chain. In other words, the graduated
response mechanism operates like an internalization of the piracy externalities, in
a way close to the ‘polluter pays’ principle.
5. Conclusion
Copyright is a property right institution that shapes the organization of all cre-
ative industries. The digitization of copyrighted goods and their dematerialized
distribution should bring new benefits thanks to more eﬃcient distribution, but
also new costs in enforcing copyright laws. Digitization and dematerialization have
made it very diﬃcult to exclude consumers from the consumption of content. As
such they have led to the development of massive online piracy, so massive that the
traditional means of heavily fining copyright infringement appears insuﬃcient: it is
too costly and more and more it is seen as unfair by the society.
As we have argued, such a situation is made possible by the behavior of the
actors of the broadband industries. On the one hand, piracy promotes the roll-out
of their infrastructure, equipment and services; on the other hand, every player
of the chain fears losing market shares by punishing its consumers when they are
infringing. As a consequence, incentives arise all along the vertical chain to let the
consumer free ride on copyright. Innovation signals can be then distorted in the
sense that copyright infringement may drive industrial research and development,
with the consequence of increasing more and more copyright enforcement costs. In
other words, as long as the consumer can free-ride on copyright at nearly no cost,
the whole copyright institution and the growing benefits it can bring to creative
industries are threatened by the powerful incentives given to new infringing means.
Graduated response mechanisms are designed to increase the expected value of
the sanction — a fine, an Internet suspension, a jail sentence — by making it cheaper
to apply and socially more balanced. Their objective is therefore to increase the
expected cost of infringing for final users. Such mechanisms help to internalize copy-
right enforcement within the Internet industry. The cost of piracy at the consumer
level should create new signals for innovation within the network architecture. The
Internet players in charge of implementing the graduated response will invest in
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technical solutions — tracking, filtering, monitoring copyrighted files, etc. — in order
to decrease the administrative costs. Such solutions will challenge the network neu-
trality doctrine which advocates innovation to be more driven by capacity increase
than by usage valuation (Shelanski, 2007). And therefore, it is probable, as shown
by the 2008 FCC decision against Comcast (Sieradzki and Maxwell, 2008), that
copyright enforcement will be at stake in the network neutrality debate. However,
it is not only copyright enforcement but, more generally, the internalization of all
the negative externalities created by the development of the digital networks which
are now to be considered in this debate.
Graduated response can be implemented through private contracts when the
market power of the right holders is strong enough to prevent all distributors to
free ride. When this is not possible a voluntary agreement between major indus-
trial players, possibly constrained by law, may stand as a solution. The French
voluntary agreement on copyright is an application of this approach. It is all the
more interesting as an object of research that it is now examined by other European
countries.
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